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I BEG YOUR PARDON: A CALL FOR 
RENEWAL OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Gavriel B. Wolfe* 
Abstract: The pardon power, often described as a safety valve on the 
criminal justice system, is in a state of atrophy. Against a backdrop of 
“tough-on-crime” rhetoric, a systemic devaluation of rehabilitation efforts, 
and significant racial disparities in punishment, the disuse of clemency 
means no possibility of exit for those who have transformed themselves 
while incarcerated. This Note examines the origins, history, and philoso-
phical underpinnings of clemency in the United States, focusing on the 
delicate balance between executive discretion and accountability. It then 
considers the structural and political factors that have contributed to the 
almost total failure of the clemency process in Massachusetts in recent 
years. The Note argues for the revitalization of executive clemency as a 
means of achieving optimal justice in individual criminal cases and sys-
tem-wide, and it suggests changes to the administration of the clemency 
process in Massachusetts to achieve that end. 
Introduction 
 Arnold L. King entered the criminal justice system young.1 At sev-
enteen, he dropped out of high school and became addicted to drugs.2 
At eighteen, he was high and in pursuit of his next supply when he shot 
and killed a man on Newbury Street in Boston.3 In 1972, King, a black 
teenager, was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.4 
                                                                                                                      
* Symposium Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2006–2007). I 
would like to thank Patty Garin for her early brainstorming, Professor Michael Cassidy for 
his feedback, and my partner Victoria Steinberg for her constant encouragement, abun-
dant generosity, and uncommonly good editorial skills. 
1 Adrian Walker, Seeking Redemption, Boston Globe, Oct. 13, 2005, at B1. 
2 Id; Arnie King, Reflections from Inside, 12 Field Notes 10, 10 (2002), available at http:// 
www.sabes.org/resources/publications/fieldnotes/vol12/fn123.pdf. 
3 Arnie King, Homeward Bound, Edge Boston, Nov. 25, 2005, http://www.edgeboston. 
com/index.php?ch=columns&sc=arnieking&id=1628. 
4 Id.; Walker, supra note 1. 
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 Arnie King is now a middle-aged man.5 He has spent decades in 
prison.6 However, he has not merely grown in years; he has also ma-
tured.7 During his time in prison, he has doggedly undertaken the pro-
ject of his own education, earning a GED, an associate’s degree, a 
bachelor’s degree, and a master’s degree.8 Perhaps most importantly, 
King has reflected on his life’s path, his incarceration, and the mistakes 
he has made, and he has chosen to share his experiences and insights 
with others.9 He has written extensively for publications on the outside, 
primarily to educate the larger community about prison life and to 
counsel against the path he followed.10 King has taken responsibility for 
having taken the life of another human being, and has communicated 
in word and deed that he has atoned for that crime.11 
 Nonetheless, despite the life changes he has effected—and despite 
having been behind bars for nearly three and a half decades, fully twice 
the length of his pre-incarceration life—King has not yet fulfilled the 
punishment that society, in the form of the jury, saw fit to impose on 
him for his offense.12 At age fifty-three, Arnie King is now beginning his 
thirty-fifth year of incarceration.13 Because he is ineligible for parole, 
he will spend the rest of his life in prison unless the Governor grants 
him clemency.14 
 Clemency is a broad term used to describe an official act, such as 
pardon or commutation, which removes some or all of the punitive 
consequences of criminal conviction.15 Typically, clemency is granted 
after an individual has been charged, tried, and convicted of a crime, 
and functions to reduce the amount of punishment that the offender 
must suffer.16 A pardon eradicates all or part of a conviction.17 It allows 
the offender to walk away with a clean slate, as though he or she had 
                                                                                                                      
5 See Walker, supra note 1. 
6 Id. 
7 See id. 
8 King, supra note 2, at 10. 
9 See Walker, supra note 1; Arnie King, Don’t Follow My Prints, Edge Boston, June 19, 
2005, http://www.edgeboston.com/index.php?ch=columns&sc=arnieking&id=1521. 
10 See, e.g., King, supra note 9; King, supra note 2, at 10. 
11 See King, supra note 9. 
12 See Walker, supra note 1. 
13 See id.; Kazi Toure: Support the Release of Arnold King, Radicalendar ( Jan. 22, 
2006), http://www.radicalendar.org/calendar/bostonimc/all/index.php?view=day&full- 
date=2006-01-22 [hereinafter Support the Release of Arnold King]. 
14 See Walker, supra note 1. 
15 Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest 4–5 
(1989). 
16 Id. at 5. 
17 Id. 
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never been tried or convicted.18 Commutation, on the other hand, 
merely reduces the severity of punishment by substituting a lesser sen-
tence for a greater one.19 In Arnie King’s case, commutation would 
mean permitting him to serve less than a life term.20 
 King has petitioned for clemency five times, and five times he has 
been turned down.21 In 2004, the Massachusetts Advisory Board of Par-
dons recommended his most recent commutation petition favorably to 
the Governor, yet his prison sentence still was not commuted.22 Instead, 
Governor Mitt Romney effectively denied him clemency by failing to 
take the matter into consideration within the year after the recommen-
dation was issued.23 By not acting, Governor Romney allowed the 
Board’s recommendation to expire.24 Arnie King will have to petition 
for clemency yet again and hope that next time his petition does not fall 
on deaf ears.25 
 King’s personal story raises questions about the operation of the 
clemency process, especially when considered against the backdrop of 
contemporary trends within the American justice system. Arnie King is 
just one of more than two million people now living behind bars in the 
United States.26 That number reflects exponential growth in recent 
decades—roughly four times more people are incarcerated today than 
were incarcerated in 1970.27 A number of factors have led to this in-
crease, including a shift in criminal justice policy toward longer sen-
tences and determinate sentences without the possibility of early re-
lease.28 
 Of course, raw numbers do not tell the whole story. Our nation’s 
overflowing prisons are mostly filled with poor, dispossessed, racial 
                                                                                                                      
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 See Moore, supra note 15, at 5. 
21 See In re Arnold L. King, Op. Advisory Bd. of Pardon 1, 2 (Nov. 9, 2004) [hereinafter 
In re Arnold L. King] (on file with the Boston College Third World Law Journal); Support 
the Release of Arnold King, supra note 13. 
22 See In re Arnold L. King, supra note 21, at 2; Support the Release of Arnold King, su-
pra note 13. 
23 See 120 Mass. Code Regs. 902.12(2) (2006); In re Arnold L. King, supra note 21, at 
2; Support the Release of Arnold L. King, supra note 13. 
24 See 120 Mass. Code Regs. 902.12(2); In re Arnold L. King, supra note 21, at 2; Sup-
port the Release of Arnold L. King, supra note 13. 
25 See 120 Mass. Code Regs. 902.12(2); In re Arnold L. King, supra note 21, at 2; Sup-
port the Release of Arnold L. King, supra note 13. 
26 See James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice 3 (2003). 
27 Id. 
28 See id. at 55. 
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minorities.29 At least forty percent—maybe even more than fifty per-
cent—of incarcerated individuals are African American.30 According 
to a Bureau of Justice Statistics report, one in three African American 
males can expect to be imprisoned during his lifetime.31 Today, sixty-
two percent of the U.S. prison population is African American or La-
tino, as compared with only twenty-three percent in 1930; in contrast, 
seventy-seven percent of inmates in 1930 were white.32 Statistics are 
similarly disproportionate for youthful offenders.33 African American 
and Latino youth are far more likely than their white peers to be sen-
tenced for both drug offenses and violent crimes, and they are likely 
to serve longer sentences.34 
 There is considerable disagreement about the reasons for these 
racial disparities.35 However, it is indisputable that the disproportionate 
number of poor people of color in prison is not merely the result of 
disproportionate offending.36 Discretionary decisions made by law en-
forcement officials also contribute to the disparity.37 Former President 
Carter put it plainly and personally when he compared the way the sys-
tem would treat his children compared with the children of his black 
neighbors: “‘All three of my boys smoked pot [growing up]. I knew it. 
But I also knew if one was caught he would never go to prison. But if 
any of my neighbors got caught . . . they would go to prison for 10, 12 
years.’”38 Statistics bear out Carter’s assertion.39 Though seventy-one 
percent of youth arrested throughout the United States in 1997 were 
                                                                                                                      
29 Justice Kennedy Comm’n, Am. Bar Ass’n, Reports with Recommendations to the 
ABA House of Delegates 49–51 (2004) [hereinafter Kennedy Comm’n Reports]; Whit-
man, supra note 26, at 57. 
30 Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 48. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 49. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 49. 
36 Id. at 51. Of course, some commentators do directly attribute the racial disparities in 
incarceration to racial disparities in criminal behavior, ignoring disparities in law enforce-
ment and other factors. Id. This, in turn, leads to race-based solutions to crime. See Brian 
Faler, Bennett Under Fire for Remark on Crime and Black Abortions, Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 2005, 
at A5. In September 2005, former U.S. Secretary of Education William J. Bennett made the 
claim that “if you wanted to reduce crime, you could . . . abort every black baby in this 
country, and your crime rate would go down.” Id. 
37 Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 51. 
38 Id. at 50 (quoting former President Jimmy Carter). 
39 Id. at 49. 
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white, white youth represented only thirty-seven percent of detained or 
committed juveniles.40 
 Clemency is frequently described as a safety valve on the criminal 
justice system that can correct inequitable flaws in the way that the sys-
tem operates.41 Today, that safety valve appears to be shut tight.42 Ex-
ecutive clemency in the United States has atrophied, yet it is needed 
now more than ever.43 The combination of the current “tough-on-
crime” climate, front-end discretion, and strict sentencing regimes ne-
cessitates a closer look at executive clemency as a remedy for inequity 
in criminal justice.44 Even if police and prosecutorial discretion could 
be eliminated, and bias removed from all criminal justice legislation, 
clemency would still be necessary because no set of legislative rules can 
work in all circumstances.45 In light of Arnie King’s frustrated commu-
tation petitions and the knowledge that clemency is necessary to a 
working justice system, it is imperative to examine the clemency process 
and analyze the reasons for its failure.46 
 Certainly, clemency is not appropriate in all cases, and the diffi-
culty of regulating its operation raises many questions.47 Some ques-
tions are more theoretical and others relate to the way that the clem-
ency power is exercised in practice. Why might a governor grant or 
deny someone clemency? What standards should apply? How do ad-
ministrative structure and contemporary theories of punishment im-
pact a jurisdiction‘s clemency activity? What makes a clemency process 
“successful”? Does someone like Arnie King deserve to continue to be 
punished? Together, these questions form the basis of an inquiry that 
is both academic and practical. 
 This Note will consider the role of discretion within the criminal 
justice system and will argue that the contemporary political bias in fa-
vor of inflexible, harsh punishment requires the existence of discretion 
on the “back end” of the criminal justice system. It will examine declin-
ing grants of clemency in the past twenty-five years and analyze how the 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. 
41 See, e.g., id. at 73; Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflec-
tions on the President’s Duty to Be Merciful, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1483, 1483 (2000). 
42 Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 71. 
43 See Love, supra note 41, at 1484–85. 
44 See Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 57–58; Whitman, supra note 26, at 
49; Love, supra note 41, at 1495. 
45 See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the 
King, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 569, 592 (1991). 
46 See Love, supra note 41, at 1484–85. 
47 See Moore, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
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administrative process and the philosophical underpinnings of clem-
ency support an anti-clemency bias. In particular, this Note focuses on 
executive clemency powers in Massachusetts, including the power of 
the Governor to commute sentences.48 Because the clemency process 
in Massachusetts is clearly defined, yet yields a negligible number of 
grants, Massachusetts serves as a useful context for exploring clem-
ency’s nationwide failure.49 Finally, this Note will explore how to reacti-
vate the clemency power, and how to balance the discretionary nature 
of clemency with guidelines to ensure that the power is neither ham-
pered nor abused, in order to best enhance justice in individual cases 
and system-wide. 
 Part I provides a brief history of clemency in the United States, 
describes its current state of atrophy, and argues for its renewal. Part II 
examines the structure of the executive clemency process in Massachu-
setts, compares that structure with its counterparts in other U.S. juris-
dictions, and identifies institutional disincentives for granting clemency 
in Massachusetts. Part III looks beyond the formal process to the un-
derlying philosophical justifications for the clemency power and sur-
veys academic scholarship in this area. Part IV traces recent changes in 
the Massachusetts Executive Clemency Guidelines as they relate to 
those justifications. Lastly, Part V synthesizes the central lessons from 
the foregoing study, and proposes modifications to the administration 
of executive clemency in Massachusetts and other jurisdictions in order 
to increase the exercise of the pardon power while maintaining ac-
countability. 
I. Clemency in the United States: Overview, History, Decline 
A. Background: History and Decline 
     Oh, mercy mercy me 
     Oh, things ain’t what they used to be 50 
 The power of the executive to grant clemency for criminal offenses 
has been an indispensable element of federal and state systems of jus-
                                                                                                                      
48 This Note will not specifically treat the subject of clemency in the context of capital 
punishment or commuting death sentences, so as to avoid the unique moral questions 
regarding the death penalty that have the potential to cloud a more general analysis. 
49 See Margaret Colgate Love, Relief from the Collateral Consequences of a 
Criminal Conviction 105 tbl.3 (2006). 
50 Marvin Gaye, Mercy Mercy Me (The Ecology), on What’s Going On (Motown Records 
1971). 
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tice since the early days of the republic.51 Indeed, the founders of the 
nation considered this executive function so important that they enu-
merated it in the Constitution among the first of the president’s pow-
ers, alongside his role as Commander in Chief.52 The states followed 
suit; nearly every state constitution contains a provision granting the 
governor the power to issue pardons.53 
 Although the power to grant clemency has a central, centuries-old 
place in the constitutional schema, that power has fallen into disuse in 
recent history.54 Clemency’s moon waxed and waned with the legal and 
political tides of the last two centuries.55 In the nineteenth century, be-
cause the American criminal justice system remained fairly primitive, 
the need for clemency was acute.56 Innovations such as parole and pro-
bation, which temper a criminal sentence, had not yet been established 
in most jurisdictions.57 The vast majority of today’s constitutional crimi-
nal procedure safeguards did not exist, and mitigating defenses, such as 
those based on mental illness, were not well developed.58 Further, no 
social safety net of federal benefits programs existed, so the conse-
quences were dire for a family with a wage-earner in prison.59 As a re-
sult, the pardon power was exercised regularly, as a matter of course.60 
Between 1860 and 1900, for example, approximately half of all presi-
dential pardon requests were granted.61 
 However, the twentieth century brought changes in legal stan-
dards, as well as a new approach to criminal justice grounded in the 
nascent behavioral sciences.62 The dawn of psychiatry offered new justi-
                                                                                                                      
51 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Love, supra note 49, at 18. Indeed, the constitu-
tional power was put to the test almost immediately after the Constitution was ratified 
when President George Washington pardoned the protagonists of the Whiskey Rebellion. 
Moore, supra note 15, at 27. 
52 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
53 Love, supra note 49, at 18; see, e.g., Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. VIII. The Presi-
dent has authority to grant clemency for “offenses against the United States.” U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Governors have power to grant clemency in cases involving violations of 
state criminal law. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Pardon Attorney, Information and 
Instructions on Pardons, http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/pardon_instructions.htm (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2007). 
54 Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 68–69; Love, supra note 41, at 1483. 
55 See generally Moore, supra note 15, at 46–86. 
56 See id. at 53. 
57 Id. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. 
60 See Moore, supra note 15, at 53. 
61 Id. 
62 See id. at 53, 56. 
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fication for criminal justice policy—the promise of treating and curing 
criminal behavior.63 Instead of merely punishing offenders, the system 
aimed to turn them into law-abiding citizens.64 
 As a result, rehabilitation became a dominant goal in the dispensa-
tion of criminal justice in the United States.65 Policymakers, now think-
ing in terms of reform, devised new sentencing schemes to match this 
purpose; instead of a fixed term, a criminal offender might be sen-
tenced to an indeterminate length of time in prison.66 The sentence 
would be satisfied only when the convicted person demonstrated that 
he was fully reformed.67 
 In this schema, clemency became an atavistic concept.68 Presuma-
bly, “[s]ince sentences would be fitted to the rehabilitative needs of 
each individual, there would no longer be a need for the institution of 
pardon.”69 In theory, sentences would be so individually tailored that 
pardoning an offender before his therapeutic punishment was com-
pleted could only poorly serve the offender and society.70 If any further 
fine-tuning was necessary, parole provided a new, discretionary post-
conviction option for individualizing the administration of justice.71 
 Despite its seeming promise, rehabilitation came under attack 
from both ends of the political spectrum in the early 1970s.72 Conserva-
tives decried its perceived potential for excessive leniency.73 Liberals, on 
the other hand, found that rehabilitation lost its shine when offenders 
ended up serving longer sentences because they were not deemed satis-
factorily reformed.74 Moreover, because rehabilitation was built on in-
dividuation of punishment-treatment, inequities abounded.75 This, in 
turn, gave rise to the concern that cultural bias regarding race and class 
might influence the duration of a person’s incarceration and be toler-
                                                                                                                      
63 See id. at 57–58. 
64 Id. at 57, 59. 
65 See Moore, supra note 15, at 55–60. 
66 Id. at 59. 
67 Id. 
68 See id. at 61. 
69 Id. at 55. 
70 See Moore, supra note 15, at 61. 
71 Id. It is critical to note that parole is not a form of clemency. Id. at 6. Rather, parole 
is a manifestation of punishment. Id. It is a judicially administered mechanism used to 
regulate a criminal offender’s liberty. Id. 
72 Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Prac-
tice, and Prospects, in 3 Criminal Justice: Policies, Processes, and Decisions of the 
Criminal Justice System 109, 122 ( Julie Horney ed., 2000). 
73 Id. 
74 See Moore, supra note 15, at 70; Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 72, at 122. 
75 Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 72, at 122. 
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ated in the name of science.76 Finally, empirical data did not appear to 
support the rehabilitation model.77 Assessment of results from hun-
dreds of studies showed that rehabilitation efforts as a whole had no 
appreciable effect on recidivism.78 
 The 1970s brought about a reevaluation and a systemic about-
face.79 Policymakers responded to an increase in drug-related crime 
with a renewed emphasis on retributivism.80 Instead of rehabilitation, 
the principal aim of criminal justice policy became making sure that 
offenders were punished according to well-defined standards and got 
their just deserts.81 Over the last few decades, political rhetoric has em-
phasized getting tough on crime.82 In policy terms, this has translated 
into aggressive policing and prosecuting, strict determinate sentencing, 
mandatory minimum sentences, and “three strikes” rules.83 
 Tough-on-crime politics have had an effect on clemency as well as 
on legislation and sentencing.84 Executives fear the “soft-on-crime” la-
bel that might come with letting offenders out of prison before their 
sentence is complete.85 Consequently, the use of the pardon power has 
                                                                                                                      
76 Id. 
77 Moore, supra note 15, at 67. 
78 Id. In fact, the data may have been considerably less conclusive than it was originally 
made out to be. Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 72, at 128–29. Studies of particular pro-
grams showed positive results, but those results were obscured by broad-brush surveys of 
the available literature. Id. More recent scholarship suggests that certain rehabilitation 
efforts did work, and distinctions can be drawn between successful and failed efforts, par-
ticularly with regard to the setting in which treatment is delivered, the type of offender 
receiving the treatment, and the integrity of the therapeutic treatment. Id. at 138. 
79 Moore, supra note 15, at 66. 
80 See Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 68. 
81 Moore, supra note 15, at 74–75. 
82 See Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 68. Since the 1970s, “tough-on-
crime” jargon has become nearly universal in American political parlance. See id. However, 
it is instructive to note that being tough on crime is not a universal international value. See 
Whitman, supra note 26, at 76. Professor James Q. Whitman describes a recent episode in 
French politics where an exposé of harsh prison conditions led to a contest among politi-
cians to demonstrate “who had the deeper commitment to making punishment more hu-
mane” and cared more about “the rights and dignity of convicts.” Id. 
83 See Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 57–58; Whitman, supra note 26, at 
49, 56–57; Love, supra note 41, at 1495. 
84 See Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 69; Love, supra note 41, at 1496–97. 
85 See Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 69. There is perhaps no more fear-
some cautionary tale than that of Governor Michael Dukakis and Willie Horton, particu-
larly in Massachusetts politics. See id. When Governor Dukakis ran for president in 1988, he 
was skewered with the soft-on-crime label because Willie Horton, a convicted murderer in 
Massachusetts, was let out of prison in 1986 and subsequently committed another brutal 
murder. Id. Ironically, Horton was not the beneficiary of clemency, but rather was out of 
prison as part of a weekend furlough program over which Governor Dukakis exercised no 
direct control. Id. 
426 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 27:417 
steadily declined in the last few decades in jurisdictions nationwide.86 
Today, the pardon power is exercised extremely rarely.87 Even when 
clemency is granted, it tends to take the form of a pardon granted after 
a punishment is fully served—granted either for symbolic value or to 
restore civil rights—and fails to confer a remission of punishment.88 
 The pardon power’s infrequent application has tarnished its repu-
tation.89 Grants of clemency have dwindled to such an extent that the 
practice is no longer perceived as a routine part of the criminal justice 
system.90 Instead, clemency’s rarity makes it appear to be an aberrant, 
and possibly outmoded, practice.91 
B. The Contemporary Need for Clemency 
  Despite its decline in practice, the need for clemency remains 
acute.92 In fact, the very factors that have led to clemency’s decline ne-
cessitate its revival.93 The tough-on-crime movement has been tough on 
                                                                                                                      
86 See id. at 70. 
87 See id. at 70–71. On the federal level, for example, the number of pardons granted 
from 1980 to 1992 plummeted more than seventy-five percent from each of the preceding 
twelve-year periods, from more than 2000 to fewer than 500. Id. at 70. President George W. 
Bush has continued this downward trend. Id. 
88 See Kobil, supra note 45, at 602. Historically, erasing the collateral consequences of 
conviction has been an essential task of the clemency power. See Love, supra note 41, at 
1491. Nonetheless, to reduce clemency to this exclusive purpose is to disregard clemency’s 
multi-faceted utility and to incautiously dispose of commutation in a wholesale manner. See 
id. at 1490. 
89 Love, supra note 41, at 1484. 
90 See id.; Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 71. Fewer pardons also mean 
greater public scrutiny. Love, supra note 41, at 1484. Since Watergate, the body politic has 
become more suspicious of government in general, and discretionary powers are particu-
larly suspect. See Cullen & Gendreau, supra note 72, at 122. President Gerald Ford’s highly 
controversial preemptive pardon of Richard Nixon contributed to a sharp mistrust of the 
clemency power and a perception that pardons are frequently politically motivated. See 
Moore, supra note 15, at 7; Jason B. Grosky, Critics: Pardons Are Too Political, Eagle-Trib. 
(Lawrence, Mass.), Oct. 13, 2002 (online version on file with the Boston College Third 
World Law Journal). 
Other high profile pardons continue to fuel that perception. Consider, for example, 
President Clinton’s pardons of a group of Puerto Rican nationalists in his final days in 
office, which was believed to be an attempt to win support from Latino voters in advance 
of Hillary Clinton’s New York Senate race. Love, supra note 41, at 1484. Or, for an example 
of a Massachusetts pardon appearing to be politically-motivated, one can turn to the 1993 
pardon by then Governor William Weld of Anthony Galluccio, an ambitious Cambridge 
City Councilor, for prior drunk driving and petty theft convictions. Michael Jonas, On Gal-
luccio, Shadow of a Doubt, Boston Globe, Apr. 2, 2006, at 6. 
91 Love, supra note 41, at 1483. 
92 Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 71. 
93 See Kobil, supra note 45, at 574. 
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American society.94 With two million people in jail, the United States 
has by far the highest incarceration rate of any Westernized democracy, 
and incarceration incurs heavy costs, both financial and social.95 The 
contemporary insistence on combining harsh punishment and little 
mercy is not sustainable.96 Moreover, this formula for justice fails to re-
flect the concerns that originally enshrined the clemency power in the 
federal and state constitutions.97 Today, scholars with widely divergent 
views about criminal justice policy share a common belief that the par-
don power should be exercised more actively.98 
 In a dramatic address at the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 
annual meeting in San Francisco on August 9, 2003, Supreme Court 
Justice Anthony Kennedy challenged the assembled lawyers to look 
critically at the criminal justice system.99 He raised fundamental con-
cerns about the fairness and success of the system, and called particular 
attention to the issue of clemency, decrying the fact that “the pardon 
process . . . seems to have been drained of its moral force.”100 He took 
the opportunity to advocate the vital importance of clemency in con-
temporary American criminal law.101 According to the ABA Commis-
sion established to study Justice Kennedy’s concerns, “[t]oday, in many 
determinate sentencing jurisdictions the pardon process is the only way 
that prisoners can have their claims of exigency considered. In such 
jurisdictions, pardon is necessary to the just and efficient functioning of 
the criminal justice system.”102 
 Despite Justice Kennedy’s adjuration, grants of clemency remain 
strikingly rare.103 In order to gain insight into the situation, it is critical 
to first look at the relationship between the rate of clemency and the 
process by which the clemency power is administered.104 
                                                                                                                      
94 See Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clem-
ency, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1501, 1530 (2000). 
95 See Whitman, supra note 26, at 3; Rapaport, supra note 94, at 1530. 
96 See Rapaport, supra note 94, at 1530. 
97 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. VIII. 
98 See Kobil, supra note 45, at 611; Love, supra note 41, at 1512. 
99 See Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual 




102 Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 72. 
103 Id. at 71. 
104 See id. at 74. 
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II. Executive Clemency and Administrative Structure 
A. The Relationship Between Structure and Grant Activity 
 Clemency is universally an executive power, but it is administered 
differently by jurisdiction.105 In some states, the governor alone decides 
whether to pardon a petitioner.106 In others, the governor is aided by 
an independent board of appointed officials.107 In some cases, the gov-
ernor merely consults the board, and in others the governor’s power is 
wholly dependent on the board’s consensus.108 
 Several scholars in the past twenty years have conducted surveys of 
clemency procedure by jurisdiction in an attempt to catalogue and 
compare the various systems.109 The most recent, compiled by Margaret 
Colgate Love, contains both information about each jurisdiction’s pro-
cedure as well as its recent pardon activity.110 According to Love’s find-
ings, few jurisdictions have a thriving pardon power.111 In fact, most 
states have not granted more than a token number of pardons each 
year since 1995.112 Only nine states issue a “substantial number of par-
dons” each year and grant a substantial percentage of the applications 
                                                                                                                      
105 Id. at 70. 
106 Id. 
107 Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 70. 
108 See id. 
109 See generally Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive Jus-
tice: Interpretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 New. Eng. J. on 
Crim. & Civ. Confinement 413 (1999); Nat’l Governors’ Ass’n Center For Policy 
Research, Guide to Executive Clemency Among the American States (1988). 
110 Love, supra note 49, at 18. Though Love’s primary focus is on the effect that par-
don can have in relieving the collateral consequences of criminal conviction, her work is a 
valuable mine of information about comparative pardon procedure more generally. See id. 
at ix, 20–21. 
111 Id. at 18. The Kennedy Commission Report similarly concluded: “preliminary re-
search indicates that even in those jurisdictions where the pardon process appears on the 
surface to be working efficiently, it rarely produces any grants.” Kennedy Comm’n Re-
ports, supra note 29, at 72. 
112 Love, supra note 49, at 21. The federal clemency system is as withered as any of the 
state systems. See Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 72 n.17. It provides one of 
the starkest examples of the failure of the clemency process to yield results. See id. The 
Justice Department has twelve officials staffing its pardon office. Id. During the first three 
years of George W. Bush’s presidency, he granted a grand total of eleven pardons—not 
quite one pardon apiece for each of the staff. Id. During the same time period, he did not 
grant a single commutation. Id. Meanwhile, he denied 580 pardon appeals and 2400 peti-
tions for commutation. Id. 
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filed.113 Other than in these states, she concludes, pardon does not 
seem to be “reasonably attainable.”114 
 According to Love, the states with the most active pardon power 
share certain characteristics of administration.115 The most robust ex-
ercise of the pardon power tends to occur where it is more regulated 
and somewhat insulated from politics.116 In each of the most active 
states, the process is regulated by law and is reasonably transparent.117 
All but two of the nine have a public application process and hold 
hearings at regular intervals.118 In most of these states, the recom-
mending board or the grantor is required to publish the reasons for 
its recommendation.119 Additionally, in the most active states, the par-
doning authority has a degree of protection from the political proc-
ess, either because the pardon power is placed in an independent 
board or because the governor’s power cannot be exercised without a 
favorable board recommendation.120 
B. Massachusetts Administrative Structure and Grant Activity: A Closer Look 
 In light of Love’s findings, one would expect the clemency power 
in Massachusetts to result in a relatively large number of grants.121 
The Commonwealth has a clear, well-regulated administrative process, 
and the Governor shares responsibility for making clemency decisions 
with an independent board.122 However, an analysis of the Massachu-
setts process proves that while the existence of these characteristics 
may correlate to more frequent exercise of executive clemency, they 
do not ensure it.123 In the past ten years, only 27 pardons have been 
granted, though about 100 petitions are filed annually.124 Even more 
                                                                                                                      
113 Love, supra note 49, at 21. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Georgia, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. Id. In the sample 
years, most of these states granted over 100 pardons and more than fifty percent of all 
applications. Id. at 108 tbl.4. 
114 Id. at 21. 
115 See id. at 20–21. 
116 Id. at 21. 
117 Id. 
118 Love, supra note 49, at 21. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See id. at 21, 105 tbl.3. 
122 Id. at 105 tbl.3. 
123 See Love, supra note 49, at 105 tbl.3. 
124 Id. 
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striking, Governor Romney did not grant a single pardon or commu-
tation during his entire four years in office.125 
 Given the infrequent grants of clemency in Massachusetts com-
pared to what Love’s study would suggest, it is useful to look in detail at 
the procedure that governs executive clemency in Massachusetts to de-
termine whether the process itself poses structural barriers to grants of 
clemency. 
1. Massachusetts Clemency Administration in Detail 
 The Massachusetts Constitution vests the pardon power in the Gov-
ernor and the Governor’s Council.126 The Governor’s Council (“the 
Council”), also called the Executive Council, is an eight-member elected 
body with the lieutenant governor serving ex-officio.127 Before a pardon 
application reaches the Council and the Governor’s desk, an adminis-
trative body, the Advisory Board of Pardons (“the Board”), conducts an 
initial review based on guidelines established by the Governor.128 The 
Board’s seven members are full-time, salaried employees, appointed by 
the Governor to five-year terms.129 
 When the Board receives a pardon application from a prisoner, it 
must give notice to specified officials within the justice system to afford 
                                                                                                                      
125 Margaret Colgate Love’s survey, conducted in 2005, found that Governor Romney 
did not use his clemency powers during his first three years in office. Love, supra note 49, 
at 105 tbl.3. That Governor Romney granted no pardons or commutations between then 
and the end of his term in office is evidenced by the fact that he submitted no pardon 
report to the legislature, and no act of clemency by Governor Romney was ever reported 
in the Boston Globe, Massachusetts’s newspaper of record. Yet Governor Romney’s prefer-
ence not to exercise his clemency powers is no secret. In a recent interview, Governor 
Romney proudly stated: “People ask me to commute sentences or to pardon criminals. I 
haven’t done that. I get a lot of recommendations, I haven’t pardoned a one.” Keller @ 
Large: Romney Discusses Laguer Case (WBZTV radio broadcast Oct. 22, 2006). 
126 Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. VIII. “The power of pardoning offences, except 
. . . impeachment . . . , shall be in the governor, by and with the advice of council, pro-
vided, that if the offence is a felony the general court shall have power to prescribe the 
terms and conditions upon which a pardon may be granted . . . .” Id. 
127 Mass.Gov, Governor’s Council, http://www.mass.gov (follow “State Government” 
hyperlink; then follow “Governor’s Council” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) [here-
inafter Governor’s Council]. 
128 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 154 (2006); see Executive Clemency Guidelines Issued 
by Governor Mitt Romney, Commonwealth of Mass. Executive Dep’t (Apr. 22, 2003) (on 
file with the Boston College Third World Law Journal) [hereinafter Romney Guidelines]. 
This Advisory Board is actually the state Parole Board wearing a different hat. Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 127, § 154. When petitioners apply for clemency, the Parole Board sits as the 
Advisory Board of Pardons. Id. 
129 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 27, § 4. 
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them the opportunity to comment on the petition.130 If the application 
is in compliance with minimal statutory and administrative require-
ments, the Board conducts a preliminary investigation and prepares a 
case summary regarding the petitioner’s criminal, social, and institu-
tional histories, as well as any other factors relevant to the issue of par-
don.131 
 Having conducted a preliminary investigation, the Board may 
submit a recommendation to the Governor and the Council, together 
with any comments received, or it may hold a public hearing on the 
merits of the petition if it determines that a hearing is necessary to be 
able to give the petition adequate consideration.132 For a pardon peti-
tion, a hearing is required if the Board determines that a petition is 
eligible for further review; for commutation, a hearing is optional.133 
When the Board issues its recommendations, it must submit specific 
reasons for them.134 
 If the Board favorably recommends that the Governor grant a par-
don, he or she may only do so with the advice and consent of the 
Council.135 If the petitioner was convicted of a felony, further proce-
dure exists; the Council must hold a public hearing of its own.136 The 
Council must have a quorum to vote, its vote must be a recorded roll 
                                                                                                                      
130 Id. ch. 127, § 154. The statutorily named officials include the attorney general, the 
chief of police of the municipality in which the crime was committed, the district attorney 
or justice of the district court, and the commissioner of correction if the prisoner is incar-
cerated in a Massachusetts correctional institution. Id. 
131 120 Mass. Code Regs. 902.04 (2006); see also id. 901.04 (setting forth the same proc-
ess for commutation petitions). The process for pardon and commutation is substantially the 
same. See id. 901.04; 902.04. Consistent with the use of “pardon” within the Massachusetts 
statutory schema, I have chosen to use the generic “pardon” to describe executive clemency 
generally. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 152. However, I will note any significant procedural 
distinctions in the text. 
It is important to note that the clemency process does not function as an appraisal of 
the original adjudication. See id. at § 154. To the contrary, the Board is prohibited from 
ever reviewing the proceedings of the trial court or considering any questions about their 
propriety. Id. 
132 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 154. Both the petitioner’s application and the Board’s 
written recommendation are public records. Id. at §§ 152, 154. However, if the facts stated 
in the report would cause undue hardship or injury to the petitioner or other individuals, 
they may be submitted separately from the recommendation itself, and may be maintained 
confidential. Id. at § 154. 
133 120 Mass. Code Regs. 901.05, 902.06. 
134 Id. at 901.11, 902.10. 
135 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 152. 
136 Id. 
432 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 27:417 
call, and the vote of a majority of the members present is required for 
the approval or disapproval of the petition.137 
 Without the consent of the Council, the Governor may not pardon 
a single prisoner.138 On the other hand, if the Council recommends 
that the petitioner be granted a pardon, the Governor has complete 
discretion regarding whether to approve or disapprove the petition, or 
whether to consider the petition at all.139 If, within a year, he or she 
takes no action on a favorable recommendation of the Board, that rec-
ommendation is considered to have been denied and the petitioner 
must reapply.140 
 Whether the Governor grants, affirmatively denies, or simply ig-
nores a pardon petition, he or she is not required to provide an expla-
nation.141 In fact, the Governor’s only reporting requirement regarding 
his or her pardon decisions is that he or she must annually communi-
cate to the state legislature a list of pardons granted and the action of 
the Board on those pardons.142 In other words, the Governor is not re-
quired to give reasons for his or her conclusion in any given case.143 
2. Structural Explanations for Grant Inactivity 
 The very structure of the Massachusetts clemency process contains 
elements of discretion, bureaucracy, and a lack of accountability that set 
the stage for a low number of grants.144 Analyzing the administration of 
clemency in Massachusetts helps explain the recent inactivity, and may 
yield lessons for other jurisdictions as well.145 
 Massachusetts may be described as having an independent advi-
sory board, because the Board is appointed, not elected.146 However, 
that does not mean that the clemency process is necessarily insulated 
from politics.147 First of all, the Governor appoints the Board members 
and chairperson to salaried jobs.148 Therefore, the Board members 
have an incentive to make decisions that are consistent with the Gover-
                                                                                                                      
137 Id. 
138 See id. 
139 See 120 Mass. Code Regs. 902.12(2). 
140 Id. 
141 See id. 
142 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 152. 
143 See 120 Mass. Code Regs. 902.12(2). 
144 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 27, § 4; id. ch. 127, §§ 152, 154. 
145 See Love, supra note 49, at 20–21, 105 tbl.3. 
146 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 27, § 4; id. ch. 127, § 154. 
147 See Grosky, supra note 90. 
148 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 27, § 4. 
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nor’s politics.149 If the Governor’s preference is to consider few pardon 
candidates, board members have a vested interest in playing a strict 
gatekeeper role, so that they might be reappointed if the Governor is 
reelected.150 The Governor will rarely, if ever, consider pardon applica-
tions that have not been recommended positively by the Board, so a 
negative recommendation functionally denies a petition.151 In fact, the 
Board is the end of the line for most pardon petitions.152 Of about 100 
applications filed each year, most are recommended negatively.153 
 The Council—which receives petitions after the Board—is also 
vulnerable to political pressure, because it is elected, not appointed.154 
Between the Council and the Governor, nine elected officials are ulti-
mately responsible for making clemency decisions.155 That means nine 
individuals who are accountable to voters.156 In a political climate in 
which society rewards being tough on crime, this bevy of politicians has 
a strong incentive to deny clemency.157 
 Apart from political pressures on the clemency process, the process 
may be hampered by its complicated structure with multiple partici-
pants and levels of review.158 Love’s study suggests that a governor’s 
clemency decision-making will be aided by an independent review 
board that can devote its full attention to the clemency process.159 How-
ever, the Massachusetts system incorporates two multi-member panels, 
and some clemency petitions require multiple proceedings.160 More-
over, between the Board, the Council, and the Governor himself, there 
                                                                                                                      
149 See id. 
150 See id. According to a Boston Bar Association Task Force report, some members 
continue to sit and vote on parole and clemency petitions even after their terms have 
ended as a matter of law. Boston Bar Ass’n, Task Force on Parole and Cmty. Reinte-
gration, Parole Practices in Massachusetts and Their Effect on Community Rein-
tegration 35–36 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/final- 
report081402.pdf [hereinafter Parole Practices in Massachusetts]. When this hap-
pens, they stay on at the governor’s sufferance unless and until they are reappointed, and 
such members are perceived as being beholden to the governor. Id. at 36. 
151 See Romney Guidelines, supra note 128, at 8. 
152 See Love, supra note 49, at 105 tbl.3. 
153 Id. 
154 See Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. VI, § I, art. XI, amend. 16. 
155 See id. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. VIII; Governor’s Council, supra note 127. 
156 See Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. VIII; id. pt. 2, ch. VI, § I, art. XI, amend. 16; 
Governor’s Council, supra note 127. 
157 See Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 69; Love, supra note 41, at 1496–
97. 
158 See Love, supra note 49, at 105 tbl.3. 
159 See id. at x–xi. 
160 See Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. VIII; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, §§ 152, 154. 
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are three opportunities for a petition to be denied.161 As a statistical mat-
ter, the more entities that need to align to grant clemency, the greater 
the probability that such an alignment will not occur.162 Practically 
speaking, the process may be too bureaucratic to yield many positive 
grants.163 
 Another administrative factor impacting the health of the execu-
tive clemency power is the fact that the Governor is not required to give 
reasons for his actions.164 Though the Board pens a report on each 
case, the Governor does not.165 It may be assumed that when the Gov-
ernor acts in accordance with the Board’s recommendation, his reason-
ing follows the reasoning in the Board’s report.166 However, when the 
Governor acts at variance with the Board, as in the case of Arnie King, 
his reasoning remains unknown.167 
 Moreover, the requirement that the Governor convey selective in-
formation to the legislature—about pardons granted, but not pardons 
denied—exacerbates the bias toward denying clemency.168 The statu-
tory scheme does not require the Governor to report denied clemency 
petitions to any entity.169 The fact that the Governor can avoid scrutiny 
for virtually all denials, but cannot likewise escape scrutiny for grants of 
clemency, may itself facilitate denials.170 Plainly put, it is politically safe 
for a governor to deny or simply ignore the Board’s positive recom-
mendations.171 If the Governor fails to act on a favorable recommenda-
tion from the Board, and there is no media attention on the case, it is 
                                                                                                                      
161 Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. VIII; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 154. 
162 See Love, supra note 49, at 105 tbl.3. 
163 See Love, supra note 41, at 1502–03; Rapaport, supra note 94, at 1533. 
164 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 152; Kobil, supra note 45, at 637. 
165 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, §§ 152, 154. 
166 See Romney Guidelines, supra note 128, at 2. 
167 See id. The governor’s reasoning may reflect the Board’s reasons, but without an in-
dependent explanation by the governor observers must resort to speculation. See id. at 8–9. 
Researchers at SUNY Albany recently began to archive clemency petitions from death row 
inmates around the country. Very little is known about what makes a petition successful. By 
analyzing hundreds of petitions and making them available to the public, the researchers 
hope to begin to figure out what “works.” See Archive Collects Pleas from Death Row, CNN. com, 
March 1, 2006, http://www.democracyinaction.org/dia/organizations/ncadp/news.jsp? 
key=2311&t=. 
168 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 152. 
169 See id. 
170 See id.; Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 69. There are arguments to be 
made for and against holding the governor accountable for clemency decisions in general. 
See Love, supra note 41, at 1512; Rapaport, supra note 94, at 1535. This section merely 
points out the potential negative impact of an uneven reporting requirement. 
171 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 152; Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 
69. 
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unlikely that the Governor would ever be called to account for his deci-
sion.172 
 A final factor that may influence the frequency of clemency grants 
in Massachusetts is the simple composition of the Board, which does 
double duty as both the Advisory Board of Pardons and the Parole 
Board.173 A Boston Bar Association (BBA) Task Force on Parole and 
Community Reintegration, which convened in May of 2000, noted that, 
at the time, the Board was composed almost exclusively of people with 
backgrounds in law enforcement and other official criminal justice 
work.174 However, the statute that sets out membership criteria for the 
Board requires that Board members have five years of experience in 
one of a variety of fields, including: parole, probation, corrections, law, 
law enforcement, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and social work.175 
Though the statute does not affirmatively require diversification, the 
BBA report contends that “the clear intent of the statute was to include 
persons from diverse backgrounds as Board members.”176 The report 
demonstrates this intent with reference to legislative history, pointing 
out that changes made to the statutory requirements throughout the 
twentieth century consistently modified the makeup of the Board, add-
ing language about gender diversity, diversity of political affiliation, and 
diversity of professional background.177 In addition, the Board itself 
adopted guidelines in 1990 that emphasize the need for “different and 
professional experiences and viewpoints” and “a range of perspectives” 
in reviewing prisoners’ cases.178 Nonetheless, the Board continues to be 
dominated by people with law enforcement or criminal justice back-
grounds.179 
 The BBA report asserts that a lack of diversity on the Board in re-
cent years statistically correlates to a lack of prisoners released on pa-
role.180 During the 1970s and 1980s, governors made appointments to 
the board that reflected the diverse backgrounds described in the stat-
                                                                                                                      
172 See Kennedy Comm’n Reports, supra note 29, at 69. The fact that the recommen-
dations of the Board are not published contributes to the general lack of accountability. See 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 154. The recommendations are public documents, but they 
are available by request rather than published. See id. 
173 See Parole Practices in Massachusetts, supra note 150, at 35. 
174 Id. at 27. 
175 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 27, § 4. 
176 Parole Practices in Massachusetts, supra note 150, at 33. 
177 See id. at 32–33. 
178 Id. at 34. 
179 See id. at 27. 
180 Id. at 34–35. 
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ute.181 In 1990, seventy percent of inmates serving non-life sentences 
were released on parole.182 Since then, the majority of appointees have 
come from backgrounds in policing, prosecution, parole and proba-
tion.183 By 2000, only forty-one percent of inmates were granted pa-
role.184 The clemency rate declined significantly during the 1990s as 
well.185 Because the same board makes decisions about parole and 
clemency, and grant rates for both declined when the board became 
more homogeneous, it is reasonable to impute the BBA report’s find-
ings regarding parole board diversity and grants to the clemency con-
text as well.186 
 In sum, a variety of administrative factors create a structural bias 
against granting clemency in Massachusetts. These factors include the 
vulnerability of the Board and the Governor’s Council to political pres-
sures; the involvement of multiple levels of bureaucratic decision-
makers; the lack of accountability when the Governor’s decision is at 
variance with the Board’s recommendation; the uneven reporting re-
quirements regarding grants and denials of clemency; and the Board’s 
lack of diversity. As a result, good reasons exist to modify the executive 
clemency administrative process in Massachusetts.187 
 Still, the structural bias against clemency alone cannot explain the 
precipitous drop in clemency grants over the last twenty-five years, be-
cause the process has remained essentially unchanged throughout this 
period.188 The same procedure—flawed though it may be—once 
yielded greater results.189 Consequently, it is imperative to seek alterna-
tive explanations for the recent decline by turning from procedure to 
substance. The underlying rationales used to justify the existence of the 
clemency power have a powerful effect on its exercise and implementa-
tion; philosophical attitudes toward clemency color the process from 
                                                                                                                      
181 Parole Practices in Massachusetts, supra note 150, at 33. 
182 Id. at 35. 
183 Id. at 34. The BBA report also considered the racial and ethnic diversity of the 
board, as well as its geographical representation. Id. More people of color were appointed 
to the board in the 1970s and 1980s, and more of the board members lived in urban 
communities to which potential parolees would likely return. Id. As of 2002, only one per-
son of color served on the board, and other than one board member who lived in West 
Roxbury, none of the board members lived in an urban area. Id. at 35. 
184 Id. 
185 See Grosky, supra note 90. 
186 See id.; Parole Practices in Massachusetts, supra note 150, at 35. 
187 See supra Part I.B. 
188 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, §§ 152, 154 (2006). 
189 See Grosky, supra note 90. 
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beginning to end.190 As a result, any study of declining clemency rates 
must take into account the philosophical justifications that undergird 
the clemency power and evaluate whether they offer any insight into the 
decline.191 
III. Philosophical Approaches to Clemency and What They Say 
About Administrative Process 
A. Philosophical Attitudes Matter 
 Philosophers and legal scholars have long argued about what prin-
ciples should guide criminal punishment and punishment remission, 
and how those principles ought to play out in practice.192 Correspond-
ingly, every criminal justice system reflects philosophical undercurrents 
and attitudes, either explicitly or embedded in its design and imple-
mentation.193 Considering the philosophical principles at play—and 
sometimes in conflict—within any clemency process can provide an 
essential framework for evaluating the process itself.194 In order to re-
flect on clemency’s sharp decline in Massachusetts, for example, it is 
necessary to consider competing theoretical justifications for the clem-
ency power and assess how those perspectives are brought to bear in its 
administration.195 
 In early American history, clemency was viewed as a gift that could 
be bestowed by the executive as a matter of grace.196 This notion of 
grace derived from the European tradition of the sovereign ruling by 
divine right and possessing the capacity for divine benevolence.197 
Clemency was an act of intervention from on high in cases where the 
law would mete out a harsh punishment but principles of equity de-
manded a less severe penalty.198 
                                                                                                                      
190 See infra Part III. 
191 See infra Part III. 
192 See generally Moore, supra note 15. 
193 See Sanford H. Kadish et al., Criminal Law and Its Processes 101 (7th ed. 
2001). 
194 See infra Part IV. 
195 See infra Part IV. Scholarly or philosophical treatises about clemency frequently use 
the words “clemency” and “pardon” interchangeably. Moore, supra note 15, at 15. Because 
various forms of clemency function similarly as instruments of tempering the criminal 
justice system, and differ only as to degree or procedure, they are typically considered 
within the same theoretical framework. See id. 
196 Moore, supra note 15, at 50. 
197 Id. at 51. 
198 See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 288 (1884). In this famous 
case, three men in a boat lost thousands of miles from the Cape of Good Hope murdered 
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 Then, in the early twentieth century, Justice Holmes described the 
concept of pardon in entirely different terms: 
A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an in-
dividual happening to possess power. It is a part of the Consti-
tutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of the 
ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served 
by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.199 
According to this formulation, clemency exists not merely for the pur-
pose of serving private justice, but also—or perhaps primarily—for the 
purpose of serving the public good.200 
 Today, these two different understandings of the clemency power— 
as a private instrument of grace and as a tool for the benefit of the pub-
lic welfare—both inform the way that constitutional authority is imple-
mented.201 State public policy, as expressed in legislative, executive and 
judicial writings, often draws upon one or both of these explanations to 
justify the existence of executive clemency and to guide its exercise.202 
In addition, contemporary philosophical approaches to clemency re-
flect the tension between the two.203 
B. Contemporary Theories of Clemency: Retributivism and Redemption 
 Scholars—both lawyers and philosophers—fiercely debate the 
theoretical justifications for clemency, and how these theories should 
best be applied in practice.204 They struggle to reconcile the history of 
clemency as a monarchic power with our constitutional scheme of 
checks and balances; to understand what role, if any, the notion of 
mercy may play in a modern, objective criminal justice system; to ac-
commodate the perceived need for a safety valve on an imperfect, over-
taxed criminal justice system; and to balance discretion against the lib-
eral, democratic ideal of equity.205 Because clemency is fundamentally 
about remission of punishment, theorists tend to articulate their views 
                                                                                                                      
and cannibalized their ill companion in order to survive. Id. at 273. The law required the 
court to sentence the defendants to death, but the Queen afterward commuted the sen-
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of the proper exercise of the clemency power in terms of the theory of 
punishment to which they subscribe.206 
1. Retributivism: Justice, Equity, Process, and Standards 
 Retributivist theorists argue that executive clemency must be made 
to operate in accordance with retributivist principles of punishment— 
that is, based on each offender getting his or her just deserts.207 Accord-
ing to this model, clemency is only justified as an extrajudicial corrective, 
compensating for any failure of the system that might be occasioned by 
the necessarily broad brush strokes of legislation.208 Retributivists view 
the history of executive clemency as marred by haphazard, arbitrary, or 
abusive discretion.209 In contrast, they believe the remission of punish-
ment must be administered in a principled, consistent fashion.210 Strict 
adherence to this philosophy leaves no room for an executive to make 
discretionary clemency decisions based on utilitarian concerns about the 
public welfare or pangs of compassion.211 
 Professor Kobil contributes to the retributivist critique of clemency 
by distinguishing between “justice-enhancing” and “justice-neutral” 
clemency decisions.212 He calls grants of clemency justice-enhancing 
when they serve the goal of fairness under the law, such that each per-
son receives the punishment he or she deserves.213 Notwithstanding the 
difficulty of objectively establishing the particular punishment deserved 
by each offender for each offense, our system of criminal justice aspires 
to such an ideal.214 Within this schema, justice-enhancing clemency is a 
magnificent retributivist tool—an “ideal vehicle for remedying many of 
the problems inherent in an imperfect, overloaded, and increasingly 
rigid system of criminal justice.”215 
 On the other hand, justice-neutral clemency is not retributivist, but 
utilitarian.216 It aims to further goals unrelated to a strict notion of jus-
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tice in relation to the specific offense.217 Kobil does not disavow the use 
of justice-neutral clemency entirely.218 Utilitarian concerns, such as spe-
cific or general deterrence, may play a role in assigning or remitting 
punishment once a determination has been made as to just deserts.219 
 However, these two distinct categories of clemency should be ad-
ministered separately according to separate principles.220 According to 
retributivists, justice-enhancing clemency should be governed by consis-
tent standards of punishment and administered according to a formal 
procedure.221 When the purpose of clemency is for justice to be served, 
the decision-making must be accountable to principles of due process 
rather than tainted by the political, discretionary concerns that inform 
utilitarian, justice-neutral clemency decisions.222 For justice-neutral de-
cisions about remission of punishment, it may suffice for an executive 
to administer clemency on an ad hoc basis.223 However, retributivists 
decry that executives usually fail to distinguish between the two types of 
clemency and approach all clemency decisions with discretion.224 As a 
result, clemency decision-making is erratic, constrained only by the ex-
ecutives’ personal prejudices as to the meaning of fairness.225 
 To avoid the unprincipled decision-making that retributivists con-
demn, the clemency power should be delegated by the executive to a 
professional, independent commission.226 The commission’s mem-
bers—like the federal judiciary and in contrast to the Massachusetts Ad-
visory Board—would be appointed by the executive with the advice and 
consent of the legislature and would serve without term limits during 
good behavior.227 In many respects, this new brand of clemency resem-
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bles an additional layer of appellate review, but Professor Kobil contends 
that it will yield a finer quality of justice than criminal adjudications 
themselves.228 Regardless of the particular administrative structure em-
ployed, it is fundamental to the retributivist approach to clemency that 
justice be evenhandedly administered according to consistent princi-
ples.229 
2. Compassionate Clemency: Redemption, Rehabilitation, Mercy, and 
Discretion 
 Other scholars argue that the retributivist camp turns its back on 
the most important characteristic of clemency—lenity driven by com-
passion.230 They contend that championing a narrow vision of “clem-
ency-as-remedial-retributive-justice” misses the point of clemency en-
tirely and disrespects the true historical tradition of the executive clem-
ency power.231 In contrast to the retributivists, Professors Elizabeth Ra-
paport and Margaret Colgate Love extol the virtues of mercy— 
clemency granted not merely for the sake of right, but for its own 
sake.232 
 Rapaport describes clemency as the discretionary power of the 
executive to exact less than the full measure of punishment from a 
wrongdoer, and she emphasizes its importance from a redemptive 
perspective.233 She criticizes the retributivist model for failing to con-
sider a prisoner’s post-conviction achievements as potential grounds 
for clemency.234 According to a retributivist perspective, taking post-
conviction achievements into account would interfere with the prin-
ciple of fully punishing each wrongdoer according to his or her just 
deserts.235 “Redemptive clemency may be deserved in the sense that it 
is earned,” she explains, but retributivists believe it is not owed, be-
cause a person’s post-conviction actions can “create no retributively-
justified entitlement.”236 
                                                                                                                      
228 See Rapaport, supra note 94, at 1532. 
229 Kobil, supra note 45, at 575. 
230 See Rapaport, supra note 94, at 1503. 
231 See id. 
232 Id.; Love, supra note 41, at 1485. Love’s scholarly perspective is informed by practi-
cal experience in the field. Love, supra note 41, at 1483 n.1. From 1990 to 1997, she served 
as a Pardon Attorney in the Department of Justice. Id. 
233 Rapaport, supra note 94, at 1503. 
234 Id. at 1523. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
442 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 27:417 
 The redemptive approach to criminal justice identifies two types 
of post-conviction achievement that should serve as the basis of clem-
ency: rehabilitation or heroic service rendered while incarcerated.237 
Opportunities to perform heroic service are few and far between, but 
rehabilitation is something all prisoners can strive for.238 The rehabili-
tation movement as a whole may not be in vogue and institutionally 
supported, but the clemency process should credit individual inmates 
who undergo positive personal transformations.239 
 The redemptive perspective sees punishment in terms of its dy-
namic, transformative potential rather than strictly in terms of just de-
serts.240 It supplants a polarized vision of good (free) and bad (incar-
cerated) people with an understanding that all people have the capac-
ity for both weakness and high moral achievement.241 Finally, redemp-
tive criminal justice incorporates the value of hope into the justice 
system: clemency on the grounds of rehabilitation “would foster hope 
for release and reconciliation among those willing to take on the rigors 
of self-transformation.”242 
 In keeping with redemptive clemency, Professor Rapaport strenu-
ously defends clemency’s historical discretionary quality.243 She de-
scribes clemency as a last resort where institutionalized public power 
has failed to respond to the call of justice.244 In light of this critical last 
resort function, redemptive criminal justice resists the retributivist sug-
gestion that clemency should operate as another level of criminal jus-
tice bureaucracy, with a “full-blown executive apparatus . . . that paral-
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lels the judicial system.”245 Such a system is not merely inefficient; it sac-
rifices the essential discretionary quality of clemency that functions as a 
check on the judicial system.246 Indeed, Rapaport praises clemency for 
its very anti-bureaucratic nature and for its ability to function in opposi-
tion to the normative views of the citizenry.247 
 Professor Margaret Colgate Love also argues passionately for the 
preservation of discretion.248 In addition, she advances the theory that 
an executive has not only the power to grant clemency, but also a duty 
to do so.249 The power to pardon, in her opinion, is a constitutional 
obligation of office, not a personal privilege.250 
 As part of that obligation, Love suggests that executive clemency 
should be exercised not only for the fulfillment of justice, but also for 
the sake of mercy and for the good of the community.251 Love encour-
ages executives to utilize the pardon power as a tool to communicate 
the value of mercy.252 Granting clemency has symbolic expressive value, 
because the President or the Governor heads an entire branch of gov-
ernment and is looked to for leadership by members of his administra-
tion and by ordinary citizens.253 As a result, the pardon power can be a 
vehicle for encouraging compassion in criminal justice policy, leading 
lower administrators by example, championing positive self-trans-
formation, and sharing a moral vision with the general public.254 
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IV. Tightening Chains: Analyzing Twenty-Five Years of 
Changes in Massachusetts Clemency Guidelines 
 Philosophical approaches to clemency inform the way in which 
clemency is carried out in practice.255 In the end, the most important 
factor for the health of executive clemency in the Commonwealth is 
the attitude of the Governor.256 Even though governors are rarely 
scholars and their attitudes toward clemency may not reflect explicit 
philosophical perspectives, philosophical trends can be seen in the lan-
guage that governors use to explain their approach to clemency deci-
sions.257 In Massachusetts, the Governor’s perspective on clemency is 
most clearly reflected in guidelines he issues to the Advisory Board of 
Pardons.258 Each governor may establish his or her own set of guide-
lines regarding executive clemency, upon which the Board is obliged to 
base its judgments.259 
 Over the last twenty-five years, Massachusetts governors have issued 
increasingly stringent guidelines.260 This comes as little surprise, given 
both the general trend toward harshness in criminal justice policy and 
the fact that Massachusetts has shifted from electing liberal Democrats 
to electing increasingly conservative Republican governors.261 Nonethe-
less, it is instructive to track changes in successive governors’ clemency 
guidelines to understand how politics, philosophy, and the clemency 
process itself formed the recipe for today’s grant rate of zero.262 The 
textual changes describe a radical shift in the Commonwealth’s phi-
losophical approach to executive clemency and shed a clearer light on 
the decline in grants.263 Furthermore, because tough-on-crime policies 
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and politics describe a national trend, the changes in Massachusetts 
likely contain lessons for the nation as a whole.264 
A. The Shift Away from Rehabilitation in Commutation Decisions 
 Governor Dukakis issued a set of guidelines for commutation and 
pardon in 1983 and modified the commutation guidelines in 1988.265 
Moderate Republican Governor Weld made further changes in the 
early 1990s.266 Then Governor Romney modified the guidelines again 
in 2003.267 One of the most striking changes from one governor to an-
other is the change in language about rehabilitation as a ground for 
commutation.268 
 In 1983, Governor Dukakis’s Commutation Guidelines placed a 
heavy emphasis on rehabilitation, framing the clemency process in those 
terms.269 Dukakis used strongly enthusiastic—almost inspirational— 
language to encourage people in prison to strive for self-improve-
ment.270 He wrote that “[t]he real possibility of future commutation relief is 
intended to serve as a strong motivation for confined persons to utilize avail-
able resources for self-development and improvement efforts and as an 
incentive for them to become law-abiding citizens.”271 
 In addition, Governor Dukakis made clear that rehabilitation was 
to be measured in an individualized manner.272 He described the com-
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mutation process as “[t]he process of ascertaining whether or not re-
habilitative ends of confinement . . . have been met in individual 
cases.”273 In order to be eligible for commutation based on rehabilita-
tion, a petitioner was required to demonstrate that he or she had, 
“within his or her capacity, made exceptional strides in self-develop-
ment and improvement.”274 Self-development and self-improvement 
were measured solely in relation to the petitioner’s initial levels of per-
sonal actualization.275 Governor Weld added an additional, objective 
criterion: the petitioner had to show that he or she was not only a bet-
ter person than at the beginning of his or her sentence, but also that 
her or she “would be a law-abiding citizen.”276 Finally, Governor Rom-
ney did away with the most individualized language in the guidelines, 
removing the reference to the petitioner’s personal capacity.277 Conse-
quently, a petitioner today must show that he or she “has made excep-
tional strides in self-development and self-improvement and would be a 
law-abiding citizen.”278 Instead of framing rehabilitation in strictly per-
sonal terms, the new standard focuses on the seemingly objective stan-
dard of whether the person would be law-abiding, but leaves that de-
termination to the personal prejudices of Board members.279 
B. Clemency Is a Privilege, Not a Right 
 In addition to the shift away from rehabilitation, the textual 
changes in successive governors’ guidelines clearly reflect another im-
portant trend. From Governors Dukakis to Romney, the attitude toward 
clemency changes from one of urgency to one of indulgence; from a 
sense that clemency is a matter of executive obligation to a sense that it 
is unworthy of significant attention.280 The 1983 Commutation Guide-
                                                                                                                      
273 Id. 
274 Dukakis Commutation Guidelines, supra note 258, at 1. Rehabilitation is one of a 
few rationales for commutation presented in Massachusetts’s clemency guidelines. See 
Romney Guidelines, supra note 128, at 6. Other rationales for commutation in Massachu-
setts have been based on a concern about gross inequities in the judicial process or a con-
cern for the physical well-being of prisoners suffering from terminal illness or chronic 
disability. See id. This Note focuses on rehabilitation because it is the most democratic 
means of achieving commutation; it is the least subject to the petitioner’s unique circum-
stances. 
275 See Dukakis Commutation Guidelines, supra note 258, at 1. 
276 See Weld Commutation Guidelines, supra note 258, at 1. 
277 See Romney Guidelines, supra note 128, at 6. 
278 Id. 
279 See id. 
280 See id. at 1; Dukakis Commutation Guidelines, supra note 258, at 1, 2. As a practical 
manifestation of his commitment to the clemency process, Governor Dukakis promised to 
 
2007] Executive Clemency and Accountability in Massachusetts 447 
lines reflect a conviction that the Governor’s constitutional authority to 
grant clemency carries an implicit duty to treat such matters seri-
ously.281 According to Dukakis, commutation is “an integral part of the 
correctional process.”282 Furthermore, Dukakis’s 1983 Pardon Guide-
lines assert that “persons who exhibit a substantial period of good citi-
zenship subsequent to criminal conviction and who have a specific 
compelling need to clear their record deserve consideration for Pardon 
relief.”283 
 Governors Weld and Romney did away with this language.284 The 
Weld Guidelines make no mention of petitioners deserving considera-
tion as a matter of right.285 In addition, they back away from Dukakis’s 
description of commutation as essential by introducing commutation 
first as “an extraordinary remedy.”286 In the introduction to the most 
recent set of guidelines, Governor Romney takes his disavowal even fur-
ther, excising the statement that commutation is integral to the correc-
tional process.287 By contrast, he makes every rhetorical effort to mar-
ginalize the clemency power and assure the reader that he will exercise 
his authority parsimoniously: “The Governor views the granting of ex-
ecutive clemency as an act of grace and not merely a remedy, which 
should be only awarded under the most rare and extraordinary circum-
stances.”288 
 Viewing clemency as “an act of grace,” Governor Romney rejects 
any suggestion of constitutional obligation and reverts to a conception 
of clemency as handed down from on high.289 Certainly, the idea of 
mercy assumes relations of status hierarchy.290 “Mercy comes de haut en 
bas: superiors accord it to inferiors. In this, mercy is akin to degrada-
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tion: when we show a person mercy, we confirm his inferior status.”291 
However, mercy correspondingly suggests magnanimity, individualiza-
tion of justice, and a willingness to find reasons why the petitioner de-
serves milder punishment.292 Governor Romney’s tightfisted approach 
to clemency neglects this side of the equation.293 
C. Philosophy Abused at the Hands of Politics; Clemency Suffers 
 All of these changes over time spell bad news for Arnie King.294 
King has spent twenty-five years executing a personal ethical transfor-
mation, and Massachusetts governors have spent twenty-five years tip-
ping the scales, devaluing such a transformation and disallowing the 
individualized consideration that would permit such a transformation 
to be acknowledged and considered significant by the Advisory 
Board.295 Governor Romney’s Guidelines reflect a dramatic shift away 
from rehabilitation and toward retributivism, yet they retain an empha-
sis on discretion that allows the Governor to refuse to grant clemency at 
will.296 
 Of course, politicians are not philosophical purists. Any governor’s 
guidelines will reflect a variety of philosophical and political principles 
rather than a coherent penological philosophy.297 As a practical matter, 
mixing and matching is not necessarily a problem.298 Criminal justice 
policy in the United States has long reflected a variety of social and 
moral concerns, including retribution, deterrence, prevention, inca-
pacitation, and behavioral correction.299 Neither retributivist nor re-
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demptive philosophy alone is sufficient to serve the variety of goals of 
criminal justice in America.300 
 However, contemporary tough-on-crime politics have taken advan-
tage of competing conceptions of clemency to achieve a severe re-
sult.301 Retributivism compels action in certain circumstances and pro-
scribes action in other circumstances.302 When clemency is governed by 
principles of just deserts and formal standards, the executive is under 
no obligation to act magnanimously and play the role of the merciful 
sovereign.303 On the other hand, redemptive clemency offers compas-
sion, but it is discretionary; compassion can always be withheld.304 If 
clemency is an act of grace, then the executive does not have to heed 
the recommendations of a review board or be compelled to grant clem-
ency, even when a retributivist would expect clemency as a matter of 
right.305 
 In today’s tough-on-crime climate, rhetoric from both philosophi-
cal perspectives may be combined to nearly preclude clemency alto-
gether.306 The net result is a systemic failure, an outcome that is anath-
ema to both philosophies.307 It is universally dismaying that the impor-
tant tool of clemency simply is not being used.308 
V. Recommendations to Renew and Improve Executive 
Clemency in Massachusetts 
 In order to renew the exercise of the clemency power in Massa-
chusetts and throughout the United States, policymakers must begin 
with a foundational belief that clemency is vital to the American consti-
tutional criminal justice system.309 This belief is grounded in the knowl-
edge that the criminal justice system is imperfect and will never be 
without flaws or inequities.310 To begin, bias is entrenched in the sys-
tem, such that it metes out disproportionate punishment for poor peo-
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ple of color—an intolerable result.311 Even ignoring bias, however, it is 
simply impossible to foresee all mitigating circumstances at sentenc-
ing.312 Clemency is a tool to adjust the output of the criminal justice 
machine; its raison d’être is to compensate for failures of justice and 
foresight.313 
 Clemency can be renewed in Massachusetts by a combination of 
means. First, the clemency process must be buffered as much as possi-
ble from political winds.314 Second, the Governor needs to be more ac-
countable for his or her decisions, particularly for clemency petitions 
denied.315 Finally, there must be a renewed emphasis on rehabilitation 
as a legitimate ground for clemency.316 
A. Diminishing the Role of Politics 
 Policymakers should consider a number of means to prevent 
clemency from being held hostage to politics. One way to protect clem-
ency from politics is to remove the Governor’s own political concerns 
from the executive clemency guidelines.317 The Governor should not 
write his or her own clemency guidelines.318 If the Governor writes the 
guidelines he or she will follow, as is the case in Massachusetts today, 
petitioners are entirely subject to the vicissitudes of the Governor’s per-
sonal preferences, anxieties and ambitions.319 Consequently, the clem-
ency power is exercised inconsistently and inequitably from governor to 
governor.320 Instead, guidelines for the Board and the Governor should 
be promulgated by a state administrative agency or the legislature. No 
governmental entity is immune from political pressures, but the effect 
of political pressure may be diminished by ensuring that a single entity 
is not responsible for both defining the criteria by which clemency 
should be granted and making the final determination regarding indi-
vidual clemency petitions.321 
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 A second means of taking politics out of clemency decision-making 
in Massachusetts is to remove the Council from the process.322 Cur-
rently, too many elected officials are responsible for clemency deci-
sions, leading to self-servingly cautious and bureaucratic determina-
tions.323 Denying clemency will always be a safer political course than 
granting it.324 However, by eliminating the role of the Council in the 
process, and thereby reducing the number of actors who have political 
interests on the line, the bias against granting clemency will be dimin-
ished.325 
 Diversifying the Board will also take some of the political pressure 
off the clemency process.326 Existing law suggests that the Board should 
be made up of members with wide-ranging expertise, and the Board’s 
own guidelines likewise call for Board members to be drawn from a va-
riety of professional fields.327 What is now simply a recommendation 
should be made a requirement.328 Ensuring that the decision-making 
body evaluating clemency petitions reflects multiple professional per-
spectives will guard against the built-in prejudice towards clemency that 
exists when that body is exclusively composed of law enforcement offi-
cials.329 
B. Increasing Accountability for Denials 
 The Governor must also be held accountable for his or her clem-
ency decisions.330 Particular attention should be paid to denials.331 To-
day, denials are silent, and that silence enables governors to deny clem-
ency without calling any critical attention to those decisions.332 Three 
simple structural changes will draw more attention to denied clemency 
petitions. First, lawmakers should require the Governor to annually re-
port denials, not just grants, to the General Court.333 Such a require-
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ment would ensure that denials of clemency are publicized, at least 
within the limited forum of the legislature; denials of clemency ought 
not to be issued entirely under the radar.334 
 Second, when a petition is recommended favorably by the Board, 
there should be a presumption in favor of clemency.335 The Code of 
Massachusetts Regulations should be amended so that any clemency 
petition that receives a favorable recommendation from the Board be 
considered granted, not denied, if the Governor does not act within a 
year.336 No petition that has received a favorable report from the Board 
should be allowed to perish as a result of the Governor’s inaction.337 
 Lastly, a new accountability mechanism should be established for 
cases in which the Governor denies petitions that the Board recom-
mended favorably.338 In such cases, the Governor should be required to 
issue an opinion explaining his or her reasons for the denial.339 The 
Governor would retain the ultimate authority with regard to clemency 
decisions, but would not retain the unchecked privilege of exercising 
that authority without any accountability.340 These three measures, in 
combination, would ensure that the Governor pays closer attention to 
denials of clemency, and that negative decisions receive external atten-
tion as well. 
C. Reviving Rehabilitation as a Ground for Clemency 
 A final way of encouraging a renewal of clemency, both in Massa-
chusetts and in other jurisdictions, is to revive an emphasis on rehabili-
tation as a basis for clemency.341 In Massachusetts, rehabilitation re-
mains a ground for granting clemency in theory, but successive gover-
nors have deemphasized it within the text of their clemency guide-
lines.342 Language in the guidelines indicating that prisoners’ self-devel-
opment would be credited and rewarded in clemency decisions has 
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faded away in recent decades.343 With this policy shift away from reha-
bilitation, grants of clemency correspondingly vanished.344 
 It is time to refocus the debate on the ways in which clemency can 
be earned.345 In light of the sharp decline in clemency that accompa-
nied a policy shift away from rehabilitation, it would appear that the 
clemency process would yield more grants again if and when it explic-
itly recognizes petitioners’ potential for personal transformation and 
rewards their individual achievements.346 In order to re-activate the 
clemency power, the guidelines for the use of that power should be re-
drafted to vigorously promote clemency based on rehabilitation.347 
Conclusion 
 Executive clemency is a vital part of the criminal justice system. It 
serves as a safety valve on the system, a particularly critical function in 
light of the system’s disproportionate impact on poor people of color. 
The near-universal decline in grants of clemency in recent years is part 
and parcel of a trend toward harsher, unremitting justice, yet that very 
trend creates a need for more clemency, not less. 
 Massachusetts represents an instructive example of the decline in 
clemency, demonstrating both that the administrative process is struc-
tured with internal biases against clemency and also that the number of 
grants is heavily dependent on the attitude of the executive. Nonethe-
less, this examination of clemency in Massachusetts offers inspiration 
for ways to renew the clemency power. The system can be reformed by 
eliminating political pressures on the process, holding the executive 
accountable for denials of clemency as well as grants, and promoting 
rehabilitation as a legitimate rationale for granting clemency. 
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 A renewal of the executive clemency power in the United States is 
overdue. Though the subject deserves additional scholarly attention, it 
is not merely academic. Arnie King and the thousands of clemency pe-
titioners around the country deserve a system that works. 
